Low Cost, Open-Source Testbed to Enable Full-Sized Automated Vehicle
  Research by Costley, Austin et al.
Low Cost, Open-Source Testbed to Enable
Full-Sized Automated Vehicle Research
Austin Costley Chase Kunz Ryan Gerdes
Rajniaknt Sharma
August 28, 2017
Abstract
An open-source vehicle testbed to enable the exploration of automa-
tion technologies for road vehicles is presented. The platform hardware
and software, based on the Robot Operating System (ROS), are detailed.
Two methods are discussed for enabling the remote control of a vehicle
(in this case, an electric 2013 Ford Focus). The first approach used digital
filtering of Controller Area Network (CAN) messages. In the case of the
test vehicle, this approach allowed for the control of acceleration from a
tap-point on the CAN bus and the OBD-II port. The second approach,
based on the emulation of the analog output(s) of a vehicle’s accelerator
pedal, brake pedal, and steering torque sensors, is more generally applica-
ble and, in the test vehicle, allowed for the full control vehicle acceleration,
braking, and steering. To demonstrate the utility of the testbed for vehi-
cle automation research, system identification was performed on the test
vehicle and speed and steering controllers were designed to allow the ve-
hicle to follow a predetermined path. The resulting system was shown to
be differentially flat, and a high level path following algorithm was de-
veloped using the differentially flat properties and state feedback. The
path following algorithm is experimentally validated on the automation
testbed developed in the paper.
1 Introduction
In recent years, the automotive industry has been automating vehicle systems
to aid drivers with features such as adaptive cruise control, lane keeping, and
collision avoidance [1]. In more advanced systems, that are not commercially
available, vehicles can drive themselves to user defined destinations [2]. Though
these driver aid systems are just starting to emerge in production vehicles, re-
search has been conducted for many years to help develop this technology [3].
The benefits of automated vehicles extends beyond convenience, and includes,
safer roadways, increased highway throughput, and reduced emissions. De-
spite these positive effects of vehicle automation, there are possible drawbacks,
and considerations should be made regarding the safety and security of these
automated systems. Hackers are constantly reviewing platforms in search of
exploitable vulnerabilities, and these automated features provide attack oppor-
tunities that were previously unavailable. For example, in [4] and [5], Miller
and Valasek showed that it was possible to exploit the parking assist, and lane
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keeping features of modern vehicles to gain limited control of acceleration and
steering. In [6], Koscher et al. demonstrate the ability to disable the braking
system of modern vehicles.
A team of undergraduate and graduate researchers at Utah State University
was assembled to automate a 2013 Ford Focus Electric. To complete this chal-
lenge, the team had to find a way to control the vehicle by superseding internal
control modules. The resulting testbed could then be used to further research in
the fields of automated vehicle control, vehicle security, and in-motion wireless
power transfer research [7]. The Electric Vehicle and Roadway (EVR) Research
Facility and Test Track [8] at Utah State University is a facility designed to
conduct in-motion wireless power transfer research, and provided lab space for
this project.
The first goal of the project was to control the vehicle without adding hard-
ware actuators. Two approaches were discussed and prioritized in the following
order: Controller Area Network (CAN) message injection, and sensor emula-
tion. CAN message injection would attempt to take control of the vehicle by
superseding modules connected to the CAN bus. Sensor emulation would su-
persede the user input sensors to manipulate the signals being sent to the CAN
modules. A reverse engineering approach would be taken to determine if the
vehicle could be controlled through either of these methods.
Having enabled remote control of the vehicle, the utility of the testbed in
allowing for automation research was demonstrated through the design and im-
plementation of a path following control strategy. First, system identification
steps were taken to develop an accurate model of vehicle dynamics due to user
input. Low level feedback controllers were developed to allow control of mean-
ingful vehicle states, and high level controller was developed to coordinate the
low level controllers to follow a desired path.
1.1 Contributions
The main contributions of this work are as follows:
• Affordable, open-source, experimentally validated automation testbed us-
ing the Robot Operating System (ROS) [9].
• Two ways to manipulate control input to the vehicle without adding ex-
ternal actuation hardware: CAN message injection and sensor emulation
that enable the development of other vehicle testbeds.
• Software packages, hardware descriptions, and a methodological approach
that can be used to remotely control nearly any vehicle, thus allowing
researchers and hobbyists to explore automation techniques and vehicle
security. The software packages are available at: https://github.com/
rajnikant1010/EVAutomation.
• Proof-of-concept exploitation of a vehicle vulnerability wherein a compro-
mised ECU or other device connected to the CAN bus (including via the
OBD-II port) could control vehicle acceleration.
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1.2 Literature Review
Control of Automated Ground Vehicles (AGV’s) has been a subject of research
since 1955 [10] and has naturally progressed to include commercially available
passenger vehicles. In [3], Rajamani details various vehicle control systems, and
modeling techniques.
There have been several automated vehicle competitions held to further the
research in this field. The DARPA Grand Challenge, for example, was started in
2004 to encourage researchers to develop off-road autonomous vehicle technol-
ogy that could be used for military applications [11]. The challenge was repeated
in 2005 for off-road vehicles [12]. Then in 2007, the challenge was altered to fo-
cus on urban driving environments [13]. The teams in these challenges started
with an existing commercial vehicle, and developed an automated system to
complete the challenge. The Grand Cooperative Driving Challenge (GCDC) is
another example of the advancement of automated driving through competition
[14]. The purpose of the GCDC is to examine cooperative automated vehicle
systems. Teams develop an automated vehicle to be used in cooperative chal-
lenges with other teams. In contrast to the work by the teams in the DARPA
Grand Challenge and GCDC, this work is open-source, low-cost, and has been
completed without vendor support. One purpose of this work is to allow other
researchers to perform vehicle automation tasks similar those in these challenges
without needing support from industry.
Koscher et al. and Checkoway et al. in [15] and [6] showed that an attacker
can gain access to Electronic Control Units (ECU’s) and circumvent vehicle
control and safety systems. They also demonstrated that the attacker could
gain access to the CAN bus remotely, and perform similar attacks. Their results
included the ability to have the car ignore a brake pedal press by the driver,
a complete vehicle shut down, and complete control of the visual display. The
attacks however, did not allow for arbitrary control of acceleration, braking or
steering, which is required for vehicle autonomy.
Miller and Valasek built on the work from Koscher and Checkoway et. al.
in [4] and [5], which detail attacks on vehicle systems in a 2010 Ford Escape,
2010 Toyota Prius, and a 2014 Jeep Cherokee. They developed an extensive
platform for attacking ECU’s and exploiting driver assist systems. However,
the attacks had limited scope for vehicle control. For example, an attack on
the parking assist module was conducted on the 2010 Ford Escape, whereby,
vehicle steering could be controlled when the vehicle was traveling at under 5
mph, but this attack would not work if the vehicle was moving faster. They
also demonstrated the ability to cause vehicle acceleration under very specific
conditions. In contrast, this work demonstrates the ability to cause arbitrary
acceleration under any condition. In addition, using the approach presented
here, the acceleration can be controlled from the OBD-II port, any bus tap
point, or by gaining access to an ECU. The current work also demonstrates the
security concern that a vehicle could be examined and reverse engineered in a
short amount of time, as it took a small team of students just under a year to
develop the automated system for a commercial vehicle.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the generalized reverse
engineering approach used to create the testbed, as well as how the methodol-
ogy naturally allows for vulnerability discovery and mitigation experimentation.
The efficacy of the testbed for automation research is demonstrated in subse-
3
Sensor CAN Module CAN Message CAN Arbitration ID
Accelerator Pedal Position Sensor Powertrain Control Module (PCM) Accelerator Pedal Position 0x204
Brake Pedal Position Sensor Automatic Braking System (ABS) Brake Pedal Position 0x7D
Steering Torque Sensor Power Steering Control Module (PSCM) Steering Torque Unknown
Steering Wheel Angle Sensor Steering Angle Sensor Module (SASM) Steering Wheel Angle 0x10
Table 1: Sensor and Module Connections for Control Signals
quent sections. Longitudinal and lateral low level controls are discussed in
Section 3, while Section 4 discusses the theory of differential flatness and the
path following controller. Section 5 gives an overview of the testbed architecture
and details the hardware and software components of the automation platform.
Section 6 shows the experimental results of the low level controllers and au-
tomation, and Section 7 summarizes the findings and concludes the paper.
2 Enabling Remote Control
Modern vehicles use a Controller Area Network (CAN) bus system for module-
to-module communication [16]. Electronic Control Units (ECU’s) are the CAN
modules that connect to the bus that send and receive information. A CAN
module receives data from sensors, processes the data, and generates the ap-
propriate CAN message to be broadcast on the bus using an analog-to-digital
operation.
The research team for the current work used the 2013 Ford Focus Electric
Wiring Guide [17] and the Auto Repair Reference Center Research Database
from EBSCOhost [18] to understand signal path and critical connections. The
wiring guide provided diagrams for most of the wires in the vehicle and included
diagrams and pin-outs for the wiring connections. The Auto Repair Reference
Center was particularly useful for reverse engineering the CAN protocols. It
contains the CAN messages generated and received by each module, diagrams
of the four CAN buses in the vehicle, and the module layout on each bus.
The CAN message information was an incomplete list of general messages sent
between CAN modules. For example, the list would indicate that a message
about the acceleration pedal position is sent from one module to another, but
it would not indicate the structure of the message, the arbitration ID, or a
conversion to useful units.
Using these resources, the team identified sensors and modules that could
be used for vehicle control. Table 1 summarizes these findings. In addition, the
team took a hands-on approach to vehicle exploration and verified the location
and connections of these components.
The examination of this architecture led to the identification of the two
possible controller insertion strategies, as shown in Fig. 1 . First, the CAN lines
between the control module and the CAN bus could be cut, and a controller
could be inserted to intercept and change messages being sent from the target
control module. Second, the analog signal wires from the target sensor could
be cut, and the controller could be inserted between the sensor and the control
module. In either strategy, the controller would insert spurious data into the
system to control the vehicle. The details and results of these two approaches
are discussed in the following subsections.
In order to successfully implement the first controller insertion strategy and
take advantage of the information on the vehicle CAN bus, the Vector CANa-
lyzer [19] system was used for the initial CAN message identification process.
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Figure 1: Vehicle CAN bus and sensor architecture. Controller insertion type 1
filters CAN messages and replaces data with the message to be injected, and is
represented by a filled black square. Controller insertion type 2 emulates sensor
output signals, and are represented by filled black circles. The TCM controls
the main drive motor of the electric vehicle and therefore actuates acceleration.
The PSCM actuates the power steering motor. The ABS module actuates the
hydraulic braking system.
This system provides an excellent visual tool for watching CAN messages in
real time. The tool displays a table of CAN messages with the rows organized
by arbitration ID. The first column of the table indicates the time since the
last message with a given arbitration ID was received. The second column lists
the arbitration ID, and the third column shows the value for each byte of the
CAN message. If a byte is changed when a new message is received, the byte is
displayed in bold. Over time the byte fades to a light gray if that value stays
the same. This was useful in identifying messages such as the accelerator pedal
position, brake pedal position, steering wheel angle, and vehicle speed. The
CANalyzer system is a great resource, but it is expensive and closed-source.
Cheaper alternatives such as the Peak Systems PCAN [20] device can be used
that have an open platform for development. An open-source solution for mon-
itoring CAN traffic with the PCAN device is provided with the open-source
software accompanying this work. Further discussion on the use of the PCAN
device can be found in Section 5.1. Another alternative is to use a microcon-
troller with a CAN bus interface module to monitor and report CAN traffic
[21].
Using the resources in the previous paragraphs, it was determined that CAN
messages have two main functions: status and control. A status message reports
the status of a vehicle component or condition, but does not control that com-
ponent or condition. For example, a module will receive input from the wheel
speed sensors and send the information on the CAN bus. Changing the data
in this message will not result in a change of vehicle speed. A control message,
however, is sent by a module to control a component or condition of the vehicle.
For example, the movement of the wing mirrors is controlled by a CAN signal,
when this message is changed the mirrors will move in response.
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2.1 CAN Message Injection
A platform for injecting CAN messages was developed using the TI TM4C129XL
microcontroller evaluation kit [21] and TI CAN transceivers [22]. The platform
would connect to the CAN bus using the first controller insertion point, between
the target module and the bus. The microcontroller was programmed to record
and playback CAN traffic. More specifically, the microcontroller would receive
the output from the control module and store it in memory. Upon user request,
the output from the control module could be injected on the CAN bus. This
platform was used to determine which messages, organized by arbitration ID,
were generated by the target control module. Using information from the Auto
Repair Center Research Database, it was determined that the Powertrain Con-
trol Module (PCM) sent a CAN message to the Transmission Control Module
(TCM) regarding the accelerator pedal position. In addition, the PCM was
the only control module that received the sensor signal from the accelerator
pedal. For these reasons, the PCM was chosen as the target module for vehicle
acceleration.
The connector diagrams in the Wiring Guide were used to determine the
CAN bus connections to the PCM. These wires were cut and routed to the CAN
injection platform. The CAN messages output from the PCM were recorded and
passed through to the CAN bus for an accelerator pedal press. The recorded
data was then played back on the bus and the vehicle accelerated as expected.
Additional code was added to the playback function to selectively playback
messages based on the message arbitration ID. This was used to search the
recorded data set and isolate the acceleration control message. The messages
were separated into two groups based on their arbitration ID, and each group
was played back to the vehicle separately. The group that resulted in vehicle
acceleration was separated again into two smaller groups and the process was
repeated until one message arbitration ID was left. The acceleration control
message was determined to be the message with arbitration ID 0x11A. Figs.
2a and 2b show successful CAN injections of the acceleration control message,
and the resulting speed for a ramp and step input, respectively. Due to the
similarities between the acceleration control message, and a throttle signal in a
gas powered car, this message is called the throttle message for the rest of this
work.
Another approach to identify useful CAN messages for vehicle acceleration
is by correlating the CAN messages with the vehicle speed. This approach was
attempted by recording an accelerator pedal press and processing the data in
Matlab. The CAN modules for the 2013 Ford Focus EV broadcast messages at
prescribed frequencies as opposed to broadcasting in response to another signal.
The speed message for the vehicle is broadcast at 100 Hz, which is the highest
frequency messages are broadcast for this vehicle. Correlation was performed on
messages of the same frequency, and the speed data was downsampled to per-
form correlation with messages at lower frequencies. The correlation returned
a value between -1 and 1 for each byte of every message to indicate how closely
correlated that byte was to the speed message. If the byte did not change dur-
ing the recording the correlation returned NAN. On the EV-HS CAN bus there
are 102 different messages and each message contains 8 bytes. The bytes were
sorted based on the absolute value of the correlation value to identify the high-
est positively or negatively correlated bytes. The bytes that had a NAN value
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Figure 2: CAN throttle message injection from controller insertion point 1
and through OBD-II port, with resulting vehicle speed. All values read from
CAN bus and represented in hexadecimal format. (a) Ramp injection from
controller insertion point 1. (b) Step injection from controller insertion point 1.
(c) Ramp injection through OBD-II port. The CAN bus was monitored from
the OBD-II port, and the injected throttle message was broadcast on the CAN
bus immediately following the reception of vehicle throttle message.
were rejected and the final number of bytes being ranked was 341. The highest
correlated byte of 0x11A was byte 4, which had a correlation value of 0.2359
and was ranked 57 out of 341. The low correlation value and rank indicates
that the throttle message would not have been identified using this strategy. In
contrast, using the approach described in the previous paragraph, the throttle
message was identified and was used to control vehicle acceleration.
The investigation of the braking system concluded that a CAN bus message
about pedal position would not actuate the hydraulic braking system. The
pedal signal is sent directly to the Automatic Braking System (ABS) CAN
module, which is the only CAN module on the vehicle that is connected to the
hydraulic brake lines. From this it was concluded that braking could not be
fully controlled through the CAN bus.
The 2013 Ford Focus EV has an option to include park assist [23]. Though
our specific vehicle did not include this option, it was determined that the
Electric Power Assisted Steering (EPAS) system had the same part number
and motor as the EPAS system in a vehicle with the park assist feature. This
meant that the power steering motor would be powerful enough to turn the
wheel at low speeds, and by extension, any speed. The Power Steering Control
Module (PSCM) receives inputs from the CAN bus and the steering torque
sensor located at the base of the steering column. The torque sensor uses a
torsion bar to determine the amount of torque being applied by the driver,
which is used by the PSCM to determine how much assist the power steering
motor should provide. Simply, for a given torque input, less assistance would be
provided by the EPAS system at higher speeds. Similar to the brake system, the
input of interest is sent from a sensor to the module that performs the desired
action. This led to the conclusion that the control of steering would have to
be controlled through torque sensor input, and not through the CAN bus. In
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Figure 3: (a) Accelerator pedal position sensor output. Two analog voltage
signals related by V1 = 2V2. (b) Brake pedal position sensor output signals.
Signal 1: 89% resting duty cycle at 533 Hz. Signal 2: 11% resting duty cycle at
482 Hz. (c) Steering torque sensor output signals. 50% resting duty cycles at
2.15 kHz.
addition, the work by Miller and Valasek [5] [4] identifies the short comings of
exploiting the park assist feature, namely, the park assist feature will cease to
control the vehicle if the speed threshold is exceeded.
2.2 Sensor Emulation
The CAN bus injection method was unable to control braking and steering,
so the sensor emulation method was explored. The accelerator pedal position
sensor was analyzed to control vehicle acceleration, the brake pedal position
sensor was analyzed to control the braking system, and the steering torque
sensor was analyzed to control the vehicle steering. Fig. 4a shows these sensors
and the following paragraphs discuss the analysis.
The accelerator pedal position (APP) sensor is located at the top of the
accelerator pedal. There are six wires connected to the APP sensor, including
two 5 V power wires with corresponding ground wires, and two signal wires.
The sensor power pins were connected to a voltage source, and the signal wires
were connected to an oscilloscope. It was determined that the sensor outputs
two DC voltages similar to the output of potentiometers. Fig. 3a shows the
voltage levels of the two output signals in response to a pedal press. The third
signal on the graph is a multiplier that relates the two signals. It is seen that
V1 ≈ 2V2.
The brake pedal position (BPP) sensor is located at the top of the brake
pedal. There are four wires connected to the BPP, including a 5 V power,
ground, and two signal wires. The BPP was connected to the voltage source
and oscilloscope in the same manner as the APP. However, the BPP outputs
two PWM signals instead of DC voltage levels. When the brake pedal is not
pressed the duty cycles of the signals settle at 89% for signal 1 and 11% for
signal 2. During a braking event the duty cycle for signal 1 decreases and the
duty cycle for signal 2 increases at the same rate. Fig. 3b shows the two PWM
signals for the BPP. The frequency of signal 1 is 533 Hz and the frequency of
signal 2 is 482 Hz.
The steering torque sensor is located at the base of the steering column.
The sensor connects to the Power Steering Control Module (PSCM) on the
CAN bus, which determines the amount of power steering assist to provide.
The assist is provided by an electric motor connected to the steering rack. In
the sensor, a torsion bar is used to connect two parts of the steering shaft, where
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the rotational displacement can be measured to determine the torque input by
the driver [24]. Similar to the BPP, there are 4 wires connected to the steering
torque sensor, including 5 V power, ground, and two signal wires. The steering
torque sensor was connected to the voltage source and oscilloscope, and it was
determined that the sensor outputs two PWM signals on the signal wires, where
both signals settle at 50% duty cycle when no torque is applied on the steering
wheel. Both signals have a frequency of 2.15 kHz. Similar to the brake PWM
signals, the duty cycles always add to 100%, and the direction that the steering
wheel is being turned determines which signal’s duty cycle increases and which
signal’s duty cycle decreases. Fig. 3c shows the two steering PWM signals.
2.3 Safety and Security
In 1996, the OBD-II (On-Board Diagnostics) specification was required to be
implemented on any new vehicle sold in the United States [25]. This specification
gives owners and technicians the ability to diagnose issues on the vehicle. The
specification standardized connectors, message formats, and frequencies. The
OBD-II port on the 2013 Ford Focus EV connects to the EV-HS CAN bus,
which is the same bus that the throttle message is sent from the PCM to the
TCM.
An attack platform was developed to inject arbitrary throttle messages
through the diagnostics port. This attack method was important because, if
successful, it would demonstrate that the acceleration of the vehicle could be
controlled with limited intrusion. This differed from the approach in Section
2.1, as it does not require access to the target module, or that the CAN wires be
cut and re-routed. Instead, this platform could be plugged into the OBD-II port
and monitor the bus for the target message arbitration ID. Also, it would show
that if an attacker was able to inject messages from any module on the EV-
HS CAN bus, then arbitrary vehicle acceleration could be caused. This would
stand in contrast to the findings in [4], [5], [6], [15], where the acceleration of
the vehicle could only be controlled under specific preconditions, and required
intrusive access to the CAN bus.
The platform was connected to the CAN bus through the OBD-II port (other
points on the bus could be used, as well) and monitored the traffic on the bus.
The user determined a target message, in this case, the throttle message, and
provided that message arbitration ID to the system. In Section 2.1, it was
determined that the throttle message is included in the data frame associated
with arbitration ID 0x11A, and is broadcast at 10 Hz. The platform waited
until a message was received with the corresponding arbitration ID, and would
replace throttle message data with an arbitrary throttle command value. The
platform was designed to only alter the parts of the message that relate to the
throttle control. The inserted message would be sent 250 µs after the actual
message, leaving 9.75 ms for the inserted message to be received and processed
by the TCM. This allowed the inserted message to dominate the period and
cause the vehicle to accelerate. Fig. 2c shows the successful ramp injection
through the OBD-II port and the resulting vehicle speed. Thus confirming the
hypothesis that vehicle acceleration can be caused by injecting CAN messages
through the OBD-II port, and therefore, could be caused at any other point on
the bus.
These results demonstrate a CAN bus security concern. If an attacker were
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able to access the CAN bus, physically, or by compromising another ECU,
they would be able to effect the acceleration of the vehicle without causing any
errors. Remote access to the vehicle, but not necessarily the requisite CAN
bus, could be effected by compromising the Telematic Control Unit (TCU) or
a wireless Tire Pressure Monitoring Sensor (TPMS). The TPMS sends a signal
to the Body Control Module (BCM), which in turn transmits a message on the
medium speed CAN bus (MS-CAN), while the TCU is connected to the I-CAN
bus (it is unlikely, however, that compromising a sensor would allow for injection
of arbitrary CAN messages onto the I-CAN or MS-CAN bus). These busses are
connected to the EV-HS bus through a gateway module; transmitting a message
from one bus to another, which would be required for either the TCU or TPMS
to impersonate the PCM by passing APP messages, was not explored in this
work. Regardless of the access approach, the driver is able to stop the unwanted
acceleration by pressing the brake pedal, however, other works indicate that it
is possible to make the vehicle ignore braking requests [5] [4] [15] [6]. This was
not investigated as part of this work. Another security concern is that of a
malicious technician. Since technicians will often access the OBD-II port when
a vehicle is being serviced, it would be quite simple for them to leave an OBD-
II injection platform connected to the OBD-II port. The acceleration control
could be initiated remotely or by a timer, causing the vehicle to accelerate at a
dangerous time.
We present two remediation strategies that could be employed to help protect
against this vulnerability. First, a simple change in the acceleration system
architecture, such that the APP sensor connects directly to the TCM, which
is the actuating module. This would remove the need of a throttle message to
be sent from the PCM to the TCM and effectively remove the attack surface.
The second approach is through device fingerprinting for both the digital and
analog signals [26] [27]. This would allow the receiving module to authenticate
the transmitting module, and prevent this type of attack.
3 Low Level Control
A simple overview of the control structure for the automated vehicle platform
is shown in Fig. 4c. The high level controller plans the path and provides
the desired vehicle speed, vdesired, and desired steering wheel angle, θdesired,
discussion on the high level controller can be found in Section 4. The low
level controllers discussed in this section are the inner loops that control vehicle
speed and steering wheel angle. The vehicle commands are τcmd, APPcmd,
and BPPcmd, and represent, steering torque, APP, and brake pedal position,
respectively.
The first step in the development of the low level controllers was to determine
a model of the system being controlled. A system model is expressed as a
transfer function relating the input to the output of the system. Models were
identified to relate the accelerator and brake pedal inputs to vehicle velocity,
and steering wheel angle to vehicle heading. The following subsections review
the model identification approach, and low level controller design process for
the Ford Focus.
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3.1 Longitudinal Model
The longitudinal characteristics of the vehicle are affected by the APP sensor,
and the BPP sensor. These two systems were tested and identified separately,
then implemented together as a complete longitudinal model.
In [28], Dias et al. perform longitudinal model identification and controller
design for an autonomous vehicle. This approach was examined for the current
work, however, a more straightforward classical controls technique using step
responses was ultimately used. Once the acceleration and braking systems were
identified, a control system was developed for each input device. The control
loops for accelerator and braking were connected by switching logic to determine
whether a the accelerator or brakes should be used. A similar two loop control
system with a switching logic component was used for the longitudinal controller
in the current work. However, this work is an open-source project that uses the
Robot Operating System (ROS) [9].
For the APP sensor system identification, the vehicle was placed on a dy-
namometer [29] and step inputs were initiated on the APP sensor from 4% to
15% at increments of 1%. Fig. 5a shows the step responses for some accelerator
pedal inputs. It was observed that for a given APP percentage the vehicle would
eventually settle at a specific speed. The relationship between APP and speed
can be described by a first order transfer function.
The general equation for a first order transfer function, G(s), can be repre-
sented by
G(s) =
K
τs+ 1
. (1)
Where K is the constant or equation that relates APP to vehicle speed, and τ
is the system time constant. The equation for K was derived from a linear fit
of the a scatter plot of max speeds from the step input, as shown in Fig. 5b,
and given by
f(x) = 3.65x− 9.7. (2)
Where f(x) is the vehicle speed and x is the APP percentage. The test track
(shown in Fig. 4b) where the vehicle was operating is an oval track with sharp
corners on the north and south side. The sharp corners and the short straight-
aways limit the vehicle operating speeds to between 15 and 25 mph for the initial
automation. The τ value that best represented the vehicle response between 15
and 25 mph was chosen as the time constant for accelerator pedal input in the
longitudinal model. Fig. 5c shows the time constants for varying APP per-
centages. The time constant for the accelerator pedal input was chosen to be 7
seconds, as this best represented the system response for the nominal operating
conditions.
For BPP system identification, the vehicle was driven in a large, flat, asphalt
area at speeds ranging from 5 to 25 mph at 5 mph increments. The vehicle was
accelerated to the desired speed by a driver. Once the vehicle obtained the
desired speed, an input to the braking system was initiated through the ROS
setup discussed in Section 5. Step inputs were initiated ranging from 5% to 50%
of BPP percentage at increments of 5% for each speed value. The speed data
seemed to show a consistent rate of change for a given BPP percentage. To
confirm this, the speed data was smoothed using a 5 point moving average, the
derivative of the smoothed data was taken by calculating the difference between
successive data points, and dividing by the elapsed time between data points.
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Fig. 5d shows the vehicle deceleration due to a braking event. It was observed
that the settling value for the deceleration rate was consistent for a given BPP
percentage and varying speeds, which concluded that the longitudinal model was
independent of current vehicle speed. This speed independence can be seen in
Fig. 6a where each line shows the deceleration rate for a given BPP percentage.
At low BPP values the lines converge meaning that deceleration is unaffected by
very small brake pedal percentages. However, at higher brake pedal percentages
the lines show distinct deceleration rates regardless of the vehicle speed. To show
the relationship between BPP percentage and deceleration, an average was taken
for each BPP value across each of the speeds. The result of this operation is
shown in Fig. 6b.
Similar to the APP model, the relationship between BPP and deceleration
could be described by a first order transfer function. After analyzing the decel-
eration curves at different BPP percentages and for different speeds the system
time constant, τ , was calculated to be 0.3 seconds. The equation that relates
BPP to deceleration was determined by finding a curve fit algorithm for the
curve in Fig. 6b. This would result in an equation that would provide a BPP
percentage for a desired deceleration rate. The equation for K is given by
f(x) = −0.0018x2 + 0.029x− 0.3768, (3)
where f(x) is the deceleration, and x is the BPP percentage. This equation is
used to describe K from the general first order transfer function equation.
3.2 Lateral Model
The lateral model of the vehicle was determined by step response analysis. The
model relates an input from the steering torque sensor to changes in the steering
wheel angle. As discussed in Section 2.2, the torque sensor measures the torque
applied by the driver, and sends that information to the PSCM. The PSCM
activates the power assist motor that connects to the steering rack, and moves
the wheels. The steering wheel angle is measured by a sensor in the steering
wheel and output on the CAN bus at a high level of precision.
Step inputs were initiated on the steering torque duty cycle signal ranging
from 50% to 63% at 1% increments. Tests were performed at a large, flat,
asphalt area with vehicle speeds ranging from 5 mph to 25 mph. Fig. 6c shows
the results of the step input tests performed at 25 mph. It was observed that
a general first order transfer function could be used to describe the relationship
between steering torque duty cycle and steering wheel angle. However, at lower
speeds and higher torque values this observation is not valid. Fig. 6d shows
the step response of the steering system at 15 mph. At the higher torque
values the steering wheel angles do not settle to a consistent steering wheel
angle. It was also observed that the settling angles for a given steering torque
duty cycle are not consistent for varying speeds. Therefore, the lateral model
identification is speed dependent and would require a speed dependent limit on
the steering torque duty cycle. Providing these characteristics, the system can
still be modeled as first order transfer function for a given speed.
The steering data was analyzed in order to determine the gain equation, K,
and the time constant, τ . Time constants were calculated for each step input
response and for each speed. Fig. 7a Bottom shows the time constants for
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given steering torque duty cycles. Each of the lines indicates the speed at which
the test was performed. It can be seen that at low speeds and low duty cycles
the time constants are not consistent. But at higher speeds the inconsistencies
lessen. A time constant, τ , of 0.2 seconds was chosen to optimize for typical
vehicle operation.
Since the lateral system was found to be speed dependent, the gain equation
K must also be speed dependent. The step input tests were performed at 5 mph
increments so a gain equation K would be found for each speed value. These
gain equations relate steering torque duty cycle to steering wheel angle. Fig.
7a shows the settling angles for varying steering torque duty cycles when the
vehicle was traveling at 25 mph. A curve fit approximation was completed for
this data set, and a solution was determined by solving the given equation. For
this data set, the given equation for K is
f(x) = 59.4x2 − 6802.7x+ 195084.5, (4)
where f(x) is the steering wheel angle and x is the steering torque duty cycle.
Figs. 6c and 6d show the step response of the vehicle due to steering torque
input signals. The graphs do not include step input values below 58% because
the step responses at such values had little effect on the steering wheel angle.
This exposed a deadband in the response from the steering torque sensor input to
the steering wheel angle. A deadband compensation algorithm was implemented
to mitigate the effects of this non-linearity. As shown in Fig. 4c, the deadband
compensation code was executed just before the signal was sent to the vehicle.
If the torque input value was greater than 50%, then
τcmd = Bmax +
τ − 50
τmax − 50 (τmax −Bmax) (5)
was used to compensate for the deadband. If the torque input value was less
than 50%, then
τcmd = Bmin +
50− τ
50− τmin (τmin −Bmin) (6)
was used to compensate for the deadband. Where τcmd is the torque command
sent to the vehicle, τ is the value received from the PI controller, Bmax is the
upper limit of the deadband, Bmin is the lower limit of the deadband, τmax
is the maximum allowed value for the steering torque signal, and τmin is the
minimum allowed steering torque signal. For the deadband on the 2013 Ford
Focus EV, the upper and lower limits were 55% and 45%, and the maximum
and minimum values for the torque signal were 64% and 37%, respectively.
3.3 PI Controller Design
Low-level control loops were designed to control vehicle speed and steering wheel
angle. The desired speed and desired steering wheel angle would be input to
the low-level control loops from a user or high-level controller. The low-level
longitudinal controller interfaced with the accelerator and brake pedals to effect
vehicle speed. A separate loop was designed for each vehicle input, and switching
logic was used to choose whether the acceleration or brake loop would be used.
The low-level lateral controller would receive the desired steering wheel angle
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and determine the appropriate input to the steering torque sensor to achieve
the desired angle.
A Proportional Integral (PI) Feedback Controller was implemented for lon-
gitudinal and lateral control. Fig. 7b shows a basic PI Feedback Controller
for a first order system. The transfer function block represents the vehicle and
contains the system model. The 1K block effectively cancels out the gain equa-
tion K, and helps relate the speed error to a vehicle input. For example, in
the longitudinal controller, the K equation receives the APP as an input, and
outputs speed. Therefore, the input to the transfer function block must be an
APP value. However, the control loop is calculating a speed error, so the output
of the PI block is a speed value. The 1K block translates the speed value into
appropriate APP value.
Since the K and 1K can be combined to equal 1, they can be ignored in the
loop equation. The open loop transfer function of this system is then given by
GOL(s) =
1
(τs+ 1)
. (7)
Closing the feedback loop and adding the PI controller gives
GCL(s) =
kp
τ
(
s+ kikp
)
s2 +
(
1
τ +
kp
τ
)
s+ kiτ
. (8)
The system is stable if the real part of the closed-loop poles are negative. Solving
for the closed loop poles and zero yields
s =
− (kp+ 1)±
√
(kp + 1)
2 − 4kiτ
2τ
, (9)
and
s = − ki
kp
, (10)
respectively. From these equations it can be determined that if kp, and ki are
positive the system will be stable.
The second order transfer function obtained through closing the loop can be
written, in a general form, as
ω2n
s2 + 2ζωns+ ω2n
. (11)
Where ζ is the damping coefficient and ωn is the natural frequency. The
damping coefficient determines whether the system will be underdamped, over-
damped, or critically damped and the natural frequency helps to determine the
time constant for the system. The time constant, τ , is given by the equation
τ = 1ζωn . Values were chosen for the damping coefficient and the time con-
stant to define the system behavior. From these values one can determine the
appropriate kp and ki for the system. The equations for kp and ki are given by
kp = τ
(
2ζωn − 1
τ
)
, (12)
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and
ki = τω
2
n, (13)
respectively. Table 2 shows the calculated values for each of the control inputs,
where the τcar column shows the time constants found during model identifica-
tion and are internal vehicle parameters.
4 GPS-based High Level Control
The high level controller was designed to take a desired trajectory or path, and
provide appropriate inputs for the low-level controllers. There are a number of
high level control strategies for manned and unmanned vehicle control [30] [31]
[32]. The control strategy should be determined by the system characteristics
and the system objectives. This platform was to be used on a ground vehicle to
track a desired trajectory and was determined to be differentially flat [33] for
the chosen states. A differentially flat system is one in which the output is a
function of the system states, the input, and the derivatives of the input, and
both the states and the input are functions of the output and the derivatives
of the output. Therefore, a simple high level controller using the properties
of a differentially flat system, and state feedback control were chosen [34]. An
example control system design for a differently flat Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
(UAV) system was demonstrated in [35]. The following paragraphs discuss
differential flatness, and the high-level controller architecture shown in Fig. 7c.
4.1 Differential Flatness
A system is said to be differentially flat if there exists an output vector y in the
form of
y = h
(
x, u, u˙, u¨, ...., u(r)
)
, (14)
such that,
x = φ
(
y, y˙, y¨, ...., y(r)
)
,
u = α
(
y, y˙, y¨, ...., y(r)
)
,
(15)
where h, φ, and α are smooth functions. The output of the differentially flat
system can, therefore, be defined by a function of the system states, the control
input, u, and the derivatives of u. The state vector and control input vector
can each be described by a function of the flat output, y, and its derivatives.
The state vector for this system was chosen to be
x =
[
pn
pe
]
, (16)
Input τcar ζ τ ωn kp ki
Accelerator Pedal 7 1 0.5 2 27 28
Brake Pedal 0.3 1 0.5 2 0.2 1.2
Steering Torque 0.2 1 0.33 3 0.2 1.8
Table 2: Table of Values for Input Loops
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where pn is the vehicle position in the north direction and pe is the vehicle
position in the east direction. The system input, u, is given by
u =
[
vn
ve
]
, (17)
where vn is the velocity in the north direction and ve is the velocity in the east
direction. The system output, y, is given by
y =
[
pn
pe
]
. (18)
From equations 16–18 it can be concluded that this is a differentially flat system
and can be defined by equations 14 and 15. The dynamic model of the system
is then given by
x˙ = Ax+Bu =
[
0 0
0 0
] [
pn
pe
]
+
[
1 0
0 1
] [
vn
ve
]
, (19)
and the output, measured by an RTK-GPS system, is given by
y = Cx =
[
1 0
0 1
] [
pn
pe
]
. (20)
4.2 Control Architecture
A virtual target scheme was selected for path and trajectory control. The vir-
tual target data was gathered by driving the vehicle around the test track and
recording the RTK-GPS data at 10Hz with 2 cm resolution. The recorded data
contained the pn, pe, vn, and ve data and was replayed in the system as a virtual
target. The state, input, and output vectors of the virtual target are denoted
as xt, ut, and yt respectively and pnt, pet, vnt, and vet are the positions and
velocities of the virtual target. The goal of the virtual target scheme is to mini-
mize the difference between the system states and the virtual target states. The
difference between the vehicle states and target states is given by x˜ = x − xt,
and the input difference is given by u˜ = u − ut. Therefore, the error model is
given by ˙˜x = Ax˜+Bu˜, where u is the commanded velocity vector. Solving for u,
and using a state feedback control strategy, where u˜ = −kx˜ gives u = ut − kx˜.
The Linear Quadratic Regulator (LQR) method was used to find the optimal
gain value for k. The entries in the system input vector, u, are notated by,
u1 and u2, and are used to obtain desired velocity by vd =
√
u21 + u
2
2, and
desired heading by ψd = tan
−1
(
u1
u2
)
. Through calculation and experimentation
a relationship was determined between the desired heading, ψd, and the desired
steering wheel angle, θd. Such that, θd = kdψd. The desired steering wheel
angle and the desired velocity are sent to the low level controllers discussed in
Section 3.
5 Testbed Platform Overview
A versatile and robust testbed platform is required to enable full-sized au-
tonomous vehicle research. The platform was designed to enable vehicle au-
tomation for both the CAN injection and the sensor emulation approaches dis-
cussed in Section 2. For the CAN injection approach the platform was able
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to monitor the CAN bus and inject the desired packets, whereas for the sen-
sor emulation approach the platform required access to the output lines of the
sensors to be emulated. In order to proceed to autonomy the platform had the
ability to sense the environment, determine vehicle location, communicate with
the vehicle, and monitor the CAN bus. A computer running Ubuntu and the
Robot Operating System (ROS) was used to communicate between the platform
components. The computer was connected to a microcontroller to allow com-
munication with the vehicle. Fig. 8 shows a diagram of the autonomous system,
including the ROS software architecture, hardware connections to devices, and
the vehicle interfacing hardware.
A ROS-based platform was chosen for ease of use, modularity, and sen-
sor interfacing packages. ROS is an open source framework that encourages
collaboration between researchers. People can contribute to the ROS effort by
creating software packages that interface with common sensors and provide tools
for development. For example, an open-source software package for ROS was
provided by Swift Navigation to interface with the Piksi RTK-GPS units [36],
which helped expedite development time for this project. The ROS architec-
ture components used in this project are packages, nodes, and topics. A ROS
package is a collection of executable files used to complete a task. Generally
packages are used to compartmentalize similar parts of a project. ROS nodes
are the executable files in a ROS package that can be written in C/C++ or
Python. A ROS topic is a way to transfer data between nodes. Any node can
publish data to a topic, and any node can subscribe to that topic to receive the
data. In this sense, the ROS topic acts as a bus to transfer data.
The following subsections detail the Interfacing Architecture, Sensing Archi-
tecture, and the Computational Architecture of the automation platform.
5.1 Interfacing Architecture
Interfacing devices are critical to the success of vehicle automation as they
provide a way to send commands to the vehicle, and monitor the vehicle for
feedback. A PCB (shown in Fig. 9a) was designed to provide a connection
between the microcontroller and the vehicle. The following subsections discuss
the microcontroller and associated hardware, and the other interfacing devices
used for this platform.
5.1.1 Microcontroller and Associated Hardware
The TI TM4C129XL evaluation kit was the chosen microcontroller platform be-
cause it offered multiple CAN bus interfaces allowing for a combination of CAN
injection and sensor emulation from the same board [21]. The microcontroller
receives input from the computer through a UART module. After performing
the appropriate computations, PWM signals are generated and appropriate DC
voltage levels are determined for vehicle input. The control signals pass through
a variety of circuit components to prepare the signals for vehicle injection. The
signals are terminated at solid state relays that select either the original vehicle
signal, or the generated signal to be sent to the vehicle. The user determines
which signal is sent based on a mode switch input to the microcontroller.
The sensor emulation approach requires four PWM signals to be generated
by the microcontroller. The signals are passed through a level shifter to shift
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the amplitudes from 3.3 V to 5 V, and then sent through operational amplifiers
in a voltage follower configuration to help drive the signals. The PWM signals
are then terminated at the normally opened terminals of solid state relays.
The accelerator pedal input is generated by a Digital to Analog Converter
(DAC) that receives an I2C signal from the microcontroller. The DAC converts
the digital communication to an analog voltage level, and sends it to an active
filter IC to clean the signal and perform a gain two operation to provide the
two output signals. The generated signals then terminate at the normally open
terminals of the solid state relays.
Another key feature of the PCB is the safety circuit. Next to the driver there
is a mode switch and an Emergency Stop button. The mode switch allows the
driver to switch between Manual Driving Mode and Autonomous Mode. The
power and solid state relay control signals are routed to the front of the vehicle
so the safety driver can switch between operating modes or press the Emergency
stop button to prevent power from reaching the circuit. The vehicle’s original
sensor signals are connected to the normally closed terminals of the solid state
relays, so removing the power returns the vehicle to Manual Mode. Power to
the circuit is provided by a NewMar DC Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS)
which connects to the 12 V car battery, and provides safe and stable voltage
levels for the circuit operations [37]. The NewMar UPS also has an internal
backup battery. The voltage level is stepped down to ± 8 V, 5 V and 3.3 V,
and distributed across the custom PCB. The UPS is shown in Fig. 9c.
5.1.2 Other Interface Devices
The Peak Systems PCAN device was chosen to monitor CAN traffic [20]. The
PCAN device can connect directly to the vehicle’s OBD-II port, and provides
serial output over USB. A picture of the PCAN device is shown in Fig. 9b.
Every message on the connected CAN bus is received and sent serially to the
computer. The user can determine which CAN data packets are important to
operation, and ignore the rest. One approach to determine necessary CAN data
packets is detailed in Section 2. Instead of using the CANalyzer system to
monitor CAN traffic, the PCAN device can be used to record CAN traffic for a
desired event (e.g. vehicle acceleration). The CAN data can be replaced section
by section until a message or set of messages is isolated. Additional information
on the use of the PCAN device for system feedback is given in Section 5.3.2.
A USB-to-serial device was used between the microcontroller and computer
to enable communication. The control system determines the appropriate inputs
to the vehicle and sends the commands to the microcontroller. The device
receives the signal from the USB port and sends it to a UART module on the
microcontroller. More information about the microcontroller and control system
is given in Section 5.3.
The TI SN65HVD230 CAN Transceiver Breakout Board [38] [22] was used
to connect the microcontroller to the CAN bus. This board provided a direct
connection with the vehicle CAN bus that can be used for monitoring and
injection.
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5.2 Sensing Architecture
The Swiftnav Piksi RTK-GPS unit [39] [40] was chosen to provide position
and velocity estimates for the vehicle. A picture of the Swiftnav Piksi unit is
shown in Fig. 9b. Swiftnav provides an inexpensive, open-source RTK-GPS
solution that provides GPS measurements at 10 Hz and ±2 cm accuracy. In
order to achieve such high accuracies the system must have a base station with
an RTK-GPS unit, and a second unit mounted to the vehicle. The two units
communicate with radio transceivers at 955 MHz. The unit mounted on the car
connects to a computer over USB and provides position and velocity data. The
base station simply needs a 5 V power supply.
The 2013 Ford Focus EV has an array of sensors on the vehicle that monitor
everything from wheel speed to tire pressure. However, the vehicle does not have
high precision wheel encoders, an RTK-GPS receiver, or inertial measurement
sensors (IMU’s) that could be useful for vehicle automation. The sensor data
is typically received by a module and sent on the CAN bus. Using the PCAN
device described in Section 5.1, the on-board sensor information can be provided
to the rest of the automation platform. For autonomous driving, the accelerator
pedal position sensor, brake pedal position sensor, steering wheel angle sensor,
and vehicle speed data are used for feedback in the low-level controllers.
The sensor data broadcast on the CAN bus does not provide the information
in empirical units, and sometimes the data is masked with other signals. An
important aspect to the sensing architecture is the conversion from CAN bus
messages to useful units. These conversions could be found experimentally for
each message found on the CAN bus, but for the purposes of this testbed the
vehicle speed was the only message converted to empirical units (MPH). The
vehicle speed is found on the message with arbitration ID 0x75 on bytes 7 and
8, and is represented by a 16-bit value where byte 7 is the upper byte and
byte 8 is the lower byte. When the vehicle was not moving the vehicle speed
was represented as 0xB0D4 on the CAN bus. The decimal representation of this
constant, 45,268, is subtracted from the 16-bit vehicle speed to align the 0 MPH
value. The vehicle was driven with the RTK-GPS units to provide a reference
for the vehicle speed, and it was determined that the CAN value would then
need to be divided by 54 to achieve an accurate measure of speed. This process
is summarized by
vmph =
(b7 << 8) + b8− 45268
54
, (21)
where b7 and b8 are the integer representations of bytes 7 and 8 from the CAN
message with arbitration ID 0x75, and the << operator represents a left bit
shift.
5.3 Computational Architecture
The computational architecture includes the code required to combine sensor
information, controller commands, and prepare command insertion. The two
computational platforms used in this system are the microcontroller and ROS.
These platforms are discussed in the following sections and code for these plat-
forms can be found at https://github.com/rajnikant1010/EVAutomation.
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5.3.1 Microcontroller Software
The code for the TI TM4C129XL was written in C and took advantage of the
built in functionality of the TivaWare Peripheral Driver Library from Texas
Instruments [41]. Table 3 shows the peripherals used and their functionality.
The following paragraphs discuss the microcontroller code.
The microcontroller receives a serial packet from the computer in the form
shown in Fig. 10. The first byte is always 0xFA, the second byte gives the
number of bytes in the payload, the payload contains the steering, braking and
acceleration commands to be sent to the vehicle, and the last two bytes is a 16-bit
Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) using the CRC16-CCITT algorithm to ensure
data integrity. Once received, the CRC is calculated to ensure correct data, and
the payload values are stored in appropriate variables. All input commands
are normalized between zero and one. For PWM signals the normalized value
represents the duty cycle of the signal, where 0.5 represents 50% duty cycle.
5.3.2 ROS Architecture
The ROS architecture consists of a series of packages, nodes, and topics [42]. A
ROS package can be used to modularize code. For example, the four packages
used for this project were swiftnav piksi (GPS), focus serial (serial communi-
cation), pcan (CAN interface), and focus control (high- and low-level control
for GPS path following). Each of these packages has at least one node and
publishes or subscribes to certain topics. A program file (either C/C++ or
Python) is written for each node and when a node publishes information to a
topic, other nodes can subscribe to that topic and receive the information that
was published. The following paragraphs will discuss each of the ROS packages,
nodes, and topics used for this system.
The swiftnav piksi package has only one node. This node initializes a connec-
tion with the GPS unit, receives the raw GPS data, and packages the data into
an Odometry message. An Odometry message is a standard ROS message that
contains information about position, velocity, angular positions, angular veloci-
ties, quaternions, and covariance matrices. The Odometry message is published
to a topic called gps data.
The pcan package has one node called can publisher that receives CAN data
from the PCAN device and parses the requested data. The CAN data is trans-
lated to useful units for the given control strategy, and published to a ROS node
called can data. The can data topic could provide as much CAN information as
the user would like. For the purposes of automating this vehicle, the CAN data
Port Pin Type Purpose
GPIO F 2 PWM Steering signal 1
GPIO F 3 PWM Steering signal 2
GPIO F 1 PWM Brake signal 1
GPIO G 1 PWM Brake signal 2
GPIO K (I2C4) 6 I2C SCL Acceleration I2C SCL line
GPIO K (I2C4) 7 I2C SDA Acceleration I2C SDA line
GPIO C 4 Logic Mode select signal from user
GPIO C 5 Logic Mode signal to system
Table 3: Microcontroller Peripherals Table
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of interest is vehicle speed in MPH and steering wheel angle.
The focus control package has two nodes: gps input and controller. The
gps input node is written in python, and it reads a .mat file with information
for a virtual target. The position and velocity data for the virtual target are
published to the gps input topic. The controller node subscribes to the can data,
gps data, and gps input topics. From the data in these topics it performs a
path following algorithm described in Section 4. The path following algorithm
provides a desired turn rate (steering wheel angle) and desired velocity for the
vehicle. The low level PI controllers discussed in Section 3.3 receive the desired
values and calculate the appropriate vehicle commands. The accelerator pedal
position, brake pedal position, and steering torque duty cycle commands are
then published to the serial data topic.
The focus serial package has one node called serial transmitter. This node
subscribes to the serial data topic and sends the accelerator pedal position,
brake pedal position and steering torque duty cycle information to the mi-
crocontroller. Before the data is sent, a Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) is
performed and a checksum is added to the serial message. The microcontroller
checks the CRC to verify the accuracy of the data before sending the requested
commands to the vehicle.
6 Experimental Results
Experiments were conducted to determine the results of the autonomous vehicle
platform. A video of the system in operation and the development process can
be found at https://youtu.be/7ohWIwb6KfM. The low level controllers were
tested with given desired steering angles and velocities. The low level steering
controller was improved by implementing a deadband compensation algorithm.
The results for the low-level controllers are given in Section 6.1.
After the low level controllers were verified through testing, experiments were
conducted for full vehicle automation by including the high-level path following
controller. The automation results are shown in Section 6.2.
6.1 Low Level Controller
The low level controllers provide speed and steering wheel angle control through
the user input signal. For the steering controller, the steering wheel torque
sensor signal was used to change the position of the steering wheel. As discussed
in Section 3, the control loop was designed such that, given a desired angle, the
controller would change the steering torque value until the desired angle was
achieved. This controller was tested using a step input and a graph of the result
can be seen in Fig. 11a. The y-axis is the steering wheel angle as represented by
a Hex value on the CAN bus. A desired steering wheel angle of 0x7D0 was used
as an input to the controller node of the ROS platform. The step response had
a maximum value of 0x891, representing an overshoot of 9.65%. The resulting
time constant of the system was 1.86 seconds. The desired behavior was for the
system to be critically damped and have a time constant of 0.33 seconds.
After implementing deadband compensation, the lateral controller improved.
Fig. 11b shows the step response of the lateral controller with deadband com-
pensation. The maximum value for this response is 2,113, which represents a
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5.65% overshoot, and has a time constant of 1.1 seconds.
The result of the longitudinal controller during autonomous driving is shown
in Fig. 11c. The velocity error is shown in Fig. 12b, where the average error
for the autonomous test was 0.34 mph (0.151 m/s).
6.2 Path and Velocity Errors of Autonomous Driving
The high level controller was tested on the 2013 Ford Focus EV. A recorded data
set of the vehicle being driven around the track was used as a virtual target for
the differential flatness algorithms discussed in Section 4. The path error was
calculated using the euclidean distance from the vehicle to the closest point on
the desired path and is given by
der =
√
(pn − pnt)2 + (pe − pet)2. (22)
A single lap autonomous test was performed with the high- and low-level
controllers, and the data was recorded. The trajectory is shown in Fig. 12a,
and the velocity plot is shown in Fig. 11c. The path and velocity error plots
are shown in Fig. 12b, where the average path error was 0.43 meters. However,
if the vehicle was permitted to immediately perform a second lap of automated
driving, the average path error for the second lap was 0.28 meters, boasting a
34.9% improvement over the first lap.
7 Conclusion
The testbed discussed in this work provides an open source vehicle automation
system that takes advantage of the vehicle’s native communication and control
systems to achieve vehicle control. This method was preferred to more expen-
sive and more intrusive platforms on the market today. The overall cost of the
components needed to automate a stock vehicle was $2,315, the itemize cost
breakdown can be seen in Table 4. The automated systems could be used to
further research in a variety of fields, including control systems, vehicle security,
and wireless power transfer. In addition to the GPS-based path following, the
low cost automation testbed is to validate a vision based path following algo-
rithm as detailed in [43]. The experiment video of vision based-path following
is available at https://youtu.be/NpAUcNh4QUY.
Future work for this project include refining low-level controllers and testing
new high-level controllers to improve lateral path accuracy to ±7 cm. To help
improve the consistency and avoid errors introduced from GPS, a stereo-vision
based controller will be implemented for lane detection.
Component Cost
Swifnav Piksi RTK-GPS $995
PCAN - CAN Bus Analyzer $225
TI Tiva C TM4C1294 $20
NewMar UPS $495
PCB and Components $80
Computer $500
TOTAL $2,315
Table 4: Itemized Cost Breakdown of Automation Platform
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(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 4: (a) The physical sensors emulated for vehicle control. Top: Steering
rack for 2013 Ford Focus EV, the steering torque sensor is located at the base of
the steering column and measures torque from driver. Bottom Left: The APP
sensor located at the top of the accelerator pedal. Bottom Right: The BPP
sensor that is usually mounted behind the brake pedal assembly and measures
the brake pedal press. (b) Aerial view of the Electric Vehicle Roadway and
Research Facility (EVR) at Utah State University. (c) High-level system block
diagram. Shows low-level control loop for lateral and longitudinal control and
high-level differential flatness path following feedback loop.
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Figure 5: (a) APP step response for 5%, 10%, and 15% pedal presses. The
graph shows a general first order speed response for a given pedal percentage.
(b) Vehicle settling speeds for given APP step input percentages. (c) Time
constants for given APP step input percentages. (d) Deceleration rate for BPP
step input of 15%. The figure shows a first order relationship between BPP
percentage and deceleration rate.
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Figure 6: (a) Vehicle deceleration for BPP percentages at a variety of speeds.
The values are the average of the deceleration rates settling point in response to
a BPP step input. The lines for BPP percentages do not cross and indicate speed
independence for the brake model. (b) Average deceleration settling rates due
to BPP step input percentages. (c) Steering torque step response for 58%, 60%,
62%, and 64% duty cycles at a vehicle speed of 25 mph. The plot indicates a
first order relationship between torque duty cycle input and steering wheel angle.
(d) Steering torque step inputs for 58%, 60%, 62%, and 64% duty cycles at a
vehicle speed of 15 mph. The plot indicates a first order relationship between
torque duty cycle input and steering wheel angles, however, at high duty cycle
percentages the first order relationship is not valid.
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Figure 7: (a) Top: Steering angle settling values for given steering torque duty
cycle step inputs. Values represented in hexadecimal format as received from
CAN bus. Bottom: Steering angle time constants for given steering torque duty
cycle step inputs at varying speeds. The time constants converge at higher
speeds. (b) General control loop for a first order PI controller. (c) High-level
system block diagram. Details the high-level control loop, and the path follow-
ing algorithm. The system block contains the low-level control loops, and the
vehicle.
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Figure 8: Testbed platform diagram including ROS system, hardware device
interfaces, and vehicle interfaces.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 9: (a) The custom circuit board used to interface with the vehicle CAN
bus and generate the signals required for the sensor emulation approach. (b)
Left: The Piksi RTK-GPS unit with GPS antenna, radio antenna for commu-
nication, and the Piksi module. Center: Vector CANalyzer system, used for
reverse engineering CAN messages. Right: The PCAN device used to interface
with the vehicle CAN bus for high-level control feedback. (c) The trunk of the
2013 Ford Focus EV with the hardware setup. Left: The NewMar UPS that
connects to the vehicles 12 V battery and supplies power to the circuit and
computer. Center: The custom PCB for interfacing with the vehicle CAN bus
and sensors. Right: Computer running Linux and ROS, connected to the Piksi
RTK-GPS unit(s), PCAN Device, and PCB.
Figure 10: Serial message structure for communication with the microcontroller.
The serial communication sends commands to the vehicle emulating the APP,
BPP, and steering torque sensors. The second byte indicates the number of
bytes in the payload, n.
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Figure 11: (a) Steering angle step response without deadband compensation.
(b) Steering angle step input with deadband compensation. (c) Desired and
actual velocity of autonomous vehicle.
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Figure 12: (a) Trajectory and path of autonomous vehicle.(b) Top: Velocity
error of autonomous vehicle for system. Bottom: Path error of autonomous
vehicle, as calculated by euclidean distance.
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